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Risk-sensitive foraging preferences in human adults were examined in relation to
the variability of reinforcement amount in a binary choice experiment with
constant delays* The goal of this study was to assess the sensitivity of males and
females to variation in reward amount using a group design with the application
of the daily energy budget and an evolutionary perspective as a model for the
choice behavior. The experimental condition consisted of a computerized choice
task with a series of forced choice trials followed by free choice trials.
Participants had to make selections between two choice options, one yielding a
fixed reward amount and the other with a variable reward, both options yielding
an equal mean reward. The goal of the game was to win a promised monetary
prize for accruing an unknown cache of points by making selections between the
two choice options. During the experimental phase of the task, the participant
had to log on to the Internet and play against an assumed competitor. The
hypotheses for the study were two-fold; the first asserts that males would
demonstrate risk-averse behavior under the positive budget (winning) and riskprone behavior under the negative-budget (losing) and that the females would
demonstrate risk-averse responding for both the positive (winning) and the
negative budget (losing) conditions, with the most risk-aversion exhibited under
the positive budget condition. The second hypothesis predicts that one or more
dimensions from form V or form VI of Zuckerman's sensation-seeking scales
would be predictive of choice behavior. The findings partially supported the
first hypothesis such that, males exhibited a risk-sensitive bias under the positive
budget condition compared to males in the negative budget. However, females
did not demonstrate a choice bias under either budget condition. For hypothesis
two, the sensation-seeking scales did not successfully demonstrate a relationship
between sensation-seeking and risk preferences among males and females in the
sample. Implications of the results for the choice preference task and the
sensation-seeking scales are discussed in terms of a general energy-budget
model.
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Risk Sensitivity in Humans 1
Are Humans Risk Sensitive Foragers?
An Experimental Model
The conditions under which humans take risks have been widely debated.
Perhaps one of the first to formally observe risk-preference outcomes was the
Swiss mathematician Daniel Bernoulli. Bernoulli (translation, 1954) posited that
individuals prefer one alternative above another in order to maximize the value
or utility of the options available. There are numerous theories and models
targeting choice behavior, all of which address this important question of why a
decision maker selects one choice over another. In the natural environment, it is
adaptive for choosing (foraging) organisms to select the food patch or resource
option that best suits their needs. The selection of the optimal choice will ensure
the forager's survival. Traditionally, the term "foraging" within the ecological
literature refers to the allocation of food by nonhuman animals. However,
foraging research has merged the fields of psychology and ecology and a more
flexible definition has been adopted. The term "foraging" in the context of this
paper will refer to the search, selection, and seizure of any desirable resource by
human or nonhuman animals. The foraging choices of individuals under the
circumstance of economics, mate selection, or even within the context of
something as trivial as finding a place to park one's car is of significance because
it may be telling of more distal explanations of behavior. In all of these
examples, one choice against all alternatives will be of greater value, the selection
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of that choice is contingent upon the perceived costs against the weighted
benefits of that choice. In other words, the rewards of each choice are variable
and it is that variability of outcomes that makes one choice riskier than another.
The sensitivity of the forager to the variability will dictate the strategy employed
by the individual in making their choice selection. It is the sensitivity of the
choosing organism to variability in reward options that is of interest in this
study. The decision to select a choice yielding a fixed or variable outcome may
provide further insight into the underlying mechanisms of choice behavior by
humans from an evolutionary perspective.
Optimal Foraging Theory

Optimal foraging theory suggests that foraging strategies show heritable
variation, which is a consequence of evolutionary pressure and that natural
selection will favor those foraging strategies that offer maximum fitness (Pyke,
G. H., Pulliam, H. R., & Charnov, E. L., 1977). In theory, the forager's choice
behavior will always maximize or minimize resource exploitation, consistent
with the risk-reward relationship between the following factors: currency
(energy gain), time (search and handling) and solving for the option yielding the
optimal cost-benefit outcome. The ideal strategy then for a forager is dependent
upon the individual needs of that organism. Schoener (1971) predicted that if an
organism has a static amount of time with which to procure its resources and if
the fitness of the forager increases continually in conjunction with nourishment
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obtained, then the organism would be an energy-maximizer. Yet, if an organism
requires time to perform other activities and the fitness of the animal does not
increase, such that the amount of energy useful to the organism is fixed, then the
forager is referred to as an energy-minimizer. Mellgren, Misasi, and Brown (1984)
provided limited evidence to support the optimal foraging model by
manipulating the travel requirements for food acquisition by two rats utilizing
various patches with differing food densities in each patch (a sandbox). The
purpose of this experiment was to assess how environmental constraints operate
to affect the foraging behavior patterns of an optimal forager. The results for one
of the two subjects demonstrated an increase in the number of food items
harvested from a given patch. The increase in harvested food items also
demonstrated an increase in the amount of time spent utilizing a given area as
travel requirements from patch to patch increased, thus providing some support
for the optimal foraging model.
Risk-Sensitive Foraging Theory

Similarly, risk-sensitive foraging theory (RSF) encompasses a number of
models, most of which are based on the following choice paradigm: an organism
has two or more foraging options (or patches) that yield the same average
amount of nourishment, but the variability of obtainable food differs from option
to option (e.g. Batson and Kacelnik, 1995). If the forager always favors the
constant or fixed option, its preference is referred to as risk-averse, but if the
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preference is for the option with greater variability, this behavior has been
labeled risk-prone. Consistent with the model of optimal foraging theory, risksensitive foraging theory also assumes that animals will behave in ways that
maximize their inclusive fitness. According to Smallwood (1996), the key
contribution of risk-sensitive foraging theory is the sensitivity of organisms to
variability in the reward rate and the preference of one foraging option over
another in relation to the energetic gain and loss by the organism. In addition,
the variability with respect to the amount or to the time to reward delivery is
variable about the mean. Whether the forager is in a positive or a negative energy
slope will be predictive of risk strategy, averse or prone. The negative or
positive energetic slope is the organism's daily energy budget.
Daily Energy Budget
\

In a natural stochastic environment, food availability is variable, as is the
interval of time between the search and the utilization of a given resource. The
foraging choices of an organism may reflect where the animal falls on its
energetic continuum. This continuum, one's positive or negative energy store is
referred to as the daily energy budget. The selection of a more variable option
reveals a higher rate of energy production (caloric) than consumption by the
organism, whereas the selection of a less variable option demonstrates the
opposite. When the average energy intake from either the variable or fixed
option exceeds the needs of the animal, the energy budget rule predicts that the
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animal will prefer the less variable option (Smallwood, & Carter, 1966). The daily
energy budget is one of the most tested predictions within foraging research with
a subject base that has a representation of virtually all classes. Examples include
nectarivorous birds (e.g. Carter & Dill, 1990; Carter, 1991; Pimm, 1978;
Wunderle, J. M., Santa Castro, S., & Fetcher, N., 1987), nectarivorous insects (e.g.
Real, 1980; Real, L., Ott, J., and Shvereine, E„ 1982; Waddington, K. D. 1995;)
gravinous birds (e.g. Bateson & Kacelnik, 1997; Caraco, 1980,1981,1983,1990;
Case, D. A.; Nichols, P., & Fantino, E., 1995; Hamm & Shettleworth, 1987; Tuttle,
E. F., Wulfson, L., & Caraco, T. 1990), migratory birds (e.g. Moore & Simm, 1986),
cichlid fish (e.g. Roche, Dravet, Bolyard, & Rowland, 1998; Young, Clayton, &
Barnard, 1990), adult humans (e.g. Pietras & Hackenberg, 2001), and rodents (e.g.
Barnard & Brown, 1985; Kirshenbaum et al., 2000). Caraco et al. (1980) tested the
hypothesized relationship between expected daily energy budgets and
sensitivity to the mean and variance of resource amount using yellow-eyed
juncos and dark-eyed juncos (1981) and found that risk-preferences could be
predicted as a result of whether the birds had obtained sufficient daily
nourishment.

The juncos adapted their foraging strategies under different

conditions. They exhibited risk-averse behavior when they succeeded in
accommodating their energy requirement, but modified that behavior in a more
risk-prone manner when they were behind in fulfilling their daily energy
requirement.
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Daily Energy Budget Models

One model of the daily energy budget, molar maximization theory,
predicts that an organism will maximize the probability of obtaining enough
food to meet the energetic costs within the specific foraging constraints.
Therefore, the preference for one option over another reflects a forager's
maximum resource requirements per unit time. A mathematical model of molar
maximization, or the z-score model, proposed by Stephens and Charnov (1982)
posits that risk-sensitivity may be conceptualized in terms of starvation due to
energetic deficits.
For organisms with exceptionally high metabolic needs, operating at an
energy shortage could lead to starvation. If the choice options lead to starvation
or survival, risk-sensitive foragers reduce the probability of starvation, such that
z represents the foraging constant or the predictive behavior of risk-averse or

risk-prone strategy use. The formula can be interpreted as follows: z = (R-u)/s,
where u is the mean food reward, s is the standard deviation of food reward,
and R is the forager's energetic requirement. The utility of this model is in the
predictive value of measuring a forager's behavior. Manipulations of variability
in reward quantity and delay to reward have demonstrated differences in riskpreference. Under conditions of varying delay, foragers are risk-prone.
Conversely, when the variability is in reward amount, foraging behavior is riskaverse. This illustrates the importance of timing as an element in risk-sensitivity
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as well as reward magnitude (Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996; Reboreda and
Kacelnik, 1991). Daily energy budget models like molar maximization and the
z-score model are referred to as second order models because they assume
fitness functions, such that risk sensitive behavior arises in order to make certain
future reproductive success. When food contributes linearly to reproductive
success, an animal foraging over an extended period of time should maximize its
mean net rate of energetic gain (McNamara, 1996).
Scalar Expectancy Theory

Not only is reward amount of significance in models of risk, an equally
important variable is time. The weighting of the various foraging options will
differ based on the differential time between search and food acquisition, and the
handling time of the food in relation to the ingestion of the prey or food item.
The intervals between meals are often referred to as the inter-capture interval,
where "capture" refers to the ingestion of the food. Weber's Law asserts that the
just noticeable (minimum) difference in prey density (prey patches as analogues
to stimuli) required to see two prey patches as different is proportional to the
mean value of the two prey patch options. If a forager expects no variability in
prey density it will register a value within the range of the true density value
plus or minus one just noticeable difference, thereby constructing a distribution
of subjective variability based on the individual forager's perceptions of prey
density. Weber's Law presents a cognitive component, which is memory, the
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memory of previous prey density in relation to what is currently experienced
(Kacelnick & Bateson, 1996).
A modified version of Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET), a continuation of
Weber's Law applied to foraging theory, suggests that a stimulus followed by a
variable delay to food or a desired resource will be remembered as the
combination of the delays in relation to the amount of food yielded after each
time interval. It is expected then that foragers will choose between two options
based on a memory representation for each delay or amount. When a
conditioned stimulus (CS) is presented to a subject, it creates a memory trace that
decays with time until the presentation of the unconditioned stimulus (US).
Following a reinforced trial, a value is attributed to the CS-US pair and the
memory trace of the CS decays in a hyperbolic manner. The hyperbolic decay
suggests that when mean delays are equivalent, a CS followed by a variable
delay to the onset of the US will be more valued than a fixed CS-US delay pair
(Kirshenbaum, 2001). SET predicts that variability in delay will be preferred
rather than a fixed option and that a fixed resource amount will be preferred to a
variable option (Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996). In other words, risk-prone behavior
should be expected when delay is manipulated and risk-averse behavior when
amount is manipulated. A problem with the SET model is that it is difficult to
predict using an energy budget manipulation because the delay to reward in
energy budget manipulations are based on the forager's success in allocating
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resources, which are typically always variable. In addition, the daily energy
budget model is based on the variability of reward, which according to SET
should be predictive of risk-aversion. But the delays are generally also variable,
which predicts risk-prone behavior, so applying SET in daily energy budget
manipulations can be problematic. These delay constraints are of central
importance in self-control studies as well; the self-control manipulations are also
based on the idea of variable and fixed delays in relation to reward amount.
Self Control Studies

A self-controlled decision is generally defined as the choice of a larger,
more delayed reinforcer over a smaller, less delayed reinforcer. Conversely, an
impulsive decision is the choice of a smaller; less delayed reinforcer over the
larger more delayed option. In self-control research, molar maximization theory
poorly predicts performance and although self-control studies are not analogous
to risk-sensitivity, they do apply the same principles of choice, the selection of
one option yielding greater energetic gain than another. Self-control research is
relevant to work in risk-sensitivity because similar mechanisms are addressed.
For example, one might expect those species that demonstrate a greater degree of
self-control to also conform more to the daily energy budget model of risksensitivity. Those species that exhibit self-control would be expected to be riskaverse under all conditions, except those that reflect an extremely negative
energy budget where not risking would ensure death or extreme loss of energy.
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A number of studies have addressed the self-control behavior of rats
(Tobin, Chelonis & Logue, 1993; Van Haaren, Van Hest, & Van De Poll, 1988)
primates (Anderson, Awazu> & Fujita, 2000; Tobin, Logue, Chelonis &
Ackerman, 1996), pigeons (Logue, Pena-Correal, Mauro, 1984; 1985; Mazur &
Logue, 1978), and humans both in adults (Forzano & Logue, 1992; Kirk & Logue,
1996; Logue & Pena-Correal, Rodriguez, & Kabela, 1986; Logue & King, 1991)
and children (Logue & Chavarro, 1992; Miller & Weinstein, 1978). Pigeons and
rats generally select the impulsive option within a self-control paradigm. While
primates, both human and nonhuman are considered self-controlled in decision
making situations, female homrnids typically choose self-controlled options
slightly more than males (Logue & Chavarro, 1992). Historically self-control
research has focused on the delay to reinforcement and the quantitative amount
of reward offered as the most critical components of behavior, while response
effort has been more conservatively addressed. The fundamental assumption
underlying the inclusion of an effort manipulation is that by increasing response
effort, self-control will also increase. Theoretically, self-control should increase
with the addition of an effort requirement because the greater response effort
taxes the individual of their energy surplus. The self-controlled option would
then promote energy conservation and maximization of reward or
reinforcement. Chelonis, Logue, Sheehy, & Mao (1998) have demonstrated that
rats typically increase self-controlled chqices as response effort increases within
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0.8 N of force, as does the response latency. In contrast, Velkey (1995) applied an
effort manipulation to an experiment using running wheels as the choice
manipulanda with two different treatment conditions. The first treatment
allowed for the concurrent operation of two different variable interval schedules.
In this experiment the rats failed to achieve self-control. In the second treatment,
the choices in the higher effort conditions were not significantly less impulsive
than those from the low effort condition, but were not self-controlled responses.
It could be argued that the inclusion of an effort variable is really operating on
the time factor; increasing the amount of effort necessary to press a lever or turn
a running wheel is in reality just increasing the pre-reinforcement delay,
something to which both pigeons and rats have been shown to be sensitive.
Social-Cognitive Models o f Choice

Analogous models of foraging theory and risk behavior can be found in
economics, social psychology and sociology. Economic models of risk,
uncertainty and decision-making generally stem from the expected utility theory
proposed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1964). Expected utility theory is
based on a set of axioms, which offer criteria for the rationality of choice. The
utility of a risky prospect is equal to the expected utility of its weighted
probability outcomes, such that a rational decision-maker will prefer the
prospect in a decision that yields the highest expected utility, provided that the
decision-maker is rational and consistent in its selections (Tversky, A. &
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Kahneman, D., 1981; Von Neumann, J. & Morgenstern, Q., 1964). Prospect
theory is essentially a modification of the expected utility theory, however noting
the violations of its assumptions like the certainty effect or choice preferences (e.g.
transivity o f preferences) that do not necessarily yield the highest expected utility.

An example of such a violation is provided by Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
given the option of selecting Choice A, which provides a 50% chance of winning
a three week tour of England, France and Italy and selecting Choice B, which
affords a one-week tour of England with certainty, 78% of a 72-person sample
selected the more probable choice. Yet when the probabilities were further
narrowed, the transitivity o f preferences axiom of the expected utility theory was
violated, using the same sample and same choices but with narrower
probabilities such that selecting Choice A, provided a 5% chance of winning a
three week tour of England, France and Italy and selecting Choice B, afforded
10% chance of winning a one-week tour of England, 67% percent of the
participants selected the less probable choice. However, it can be argued that
this is in fact not a violation of the transivity of preference axiom because the
options in the two paradigms are not equivalent. In the first option, there is a
certain probability and a 0.5 probability of gain. In the second option, the
combined probability of gain is only 0.15, suggesting that subjects or decision
makers may be assessing the likelihood of gaining anything. If one does not
believe they will come away with a gain, then there is nothing to be lost in
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selecting the higher reward condition. This preference switch is also referred to
as the reflection effect, such that if the probabilities do not change, the two
preferences are a reflection of one another. The reflection effect is analogous
with respect to mean reward, the idea of a forager switching from a risk-averse
to a risk-prone choice strategy. Risk-sensitive foraging theory does have a more
subjective component just as this model of expected utility. The choice of the
variable rewards patch or the constant food patch will be selected based on the
organism's energetic requirements. If the animal requires little to satisfy its
energetic necessities, then choose the constant option, but if the animal is at an
energetic deficit, then choose the variable option. This choice between the two
foraging strategies will be a subjective process of energetic interpretation. Utility
and prospect theories are analogous to the biological foraging models. They all
predict the maximization of gain and the minimization of loss in a decision
dictated by uncertainty; nevertheless they cannot be entirely analogous since
individuals foraging for food resources are often in the context of a starvation
situation.
The security-potential/aspiration theory (SP/A) asserts that individuals
tend to select either a low risk with a small outcome or they exploit the potential
in a given situation by attempting to obtain the best results; which are then
subject to the interpretation of the decision-maker. The smallest outcome that a
person deems acceptable will influence one's level of risk taking (Lopes, L.L.,
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1983; 1984; 1987; Schneider) and Lopes, 1968). Wang (1996) demonstrated that
adults are more willing to select a riskier choice option if the lesser outcome is
below their minimum aspiration level. SP/A recognizes individual differences
and variability in choice more than the preceding utility models. SP/A
addresses the idea that those with a lower aspiration level are likely securityseekers, who are more motivated to play it safe than to take larger risks. This
security-seeking behavior is comparable to the risk-averse organism in foraging
theory, such that the evaluation of the attained resource or potential is sufficient
to warrant a more conservative risk strategy, in the case of a forager, the lesser
variance option.
Sex Differences in Choice Behavior

Another variable to consider in risk-taking behavior is that of sex. Given
the differences inherent to males and females regarding parental investment
from an evolutionary perspective, it is not unreasonable to assume that females
will be more risk-averse than males. Females would have to choose foraging
patches based not only for their own survival, but also on behalf of their young.
A female may be more likely to select the conservative or safe foraging option
unless death was eminent and therefore would be risk-averse under most
conditions except extreme negative budgets. It could be argued that one would
expect to see more dramatic differences in employed foraging strategies by
females if she must maintain her own inclusive fitness. In theory, it would be
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more advantageous for females to select the risk-prone strategy only in times of
extreme dearth. In spite of this, it is unlikely that a female would select a more
variable food patch over a constant resource and risk the potential loss of her
offspring unless choosing not to take the risky option ensured death.
Slovic (1966) conducted an experiment involving a sample of 1,047
children ranging in age from 6-16. The children volunteered to play a game for
the chance at winning M & M candies. The purpose of this study was to provide
evidence for the validity of the masculinity-boldness stereotype by studying the
influence of age and sex upon decision-making and youngsters' performance on
a task involving risk. The results of this study specifically lend credence to the
prediction that females would be more risk-averse than males. Slovic's study has
been colloquially referred to in the literature as "the toggle-switch study"
(Kopfstein, 1973) because it utilized a switchboard with ten toggle switches. Out
of the ten switches, one switch acted as a "disaster switch," such that the
selection of this switch would result in the loss of their earned cache of M&Ms. It
was impossible for the participant to tell which switch was the "disaster switch"
so they had to flip the switches based on their mental assessment of the
probability of flipping a non-disaster switch and adding a spoonful of M & Ms to
their cache. Maximization would have been to take the risk of five pulls and
then stop and collect the reward cache because after five pulls, the probability of
switching the disaster toggle would be greater than a safe pull. Slovic's results
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indicated that females took less risk with M & M rewards than the boys. In
addition, the caution exhibited by the girls (total average of 2.20 spoons) was an
advantageous strategy, they earned more M & Ms than the boys (total average of
1.84 spoons). The optimal performance strategy used by girls in this study is
analogous to optimal foraging theory. The decision to stop flipping toggle
switches may demonstrate probability monitoring and an evaluation of the cost
to benefit relationship between continuing to risk and to quit while ahead. The
optimal foraging strategy in this case then was to quit half way through the task
in order to maximize one's net gain prior to losing all of the M & M rewards.
This is not counter to the daily energy budget rule because females may still
exhibit risk-proneness under negative energy conditions, but in relation to males
it will be less risk-prone. Although the aim of Slovic's research was to support
the boldness stereotype, the "toggle-switch study" may have simply
demonstrated conservative risk-taking on the part of the females in order to
maximize their net gain.
Kass (1964) addressed decision-making behavior in children as a function
of sex and probability preference as well. The sample consisted of 52 preschool
and elementary school children evenly divided by sex. The task utilized three
identical, simulated slot machines mounted side-by-side. A penny was required
for operation of each machine. The machines were assigned probabilities of 1/1,
with a very low reward; the second machine had a probability of 1/3, with an
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intermediate reward amount and 1/8, with a high reward amount. The
participants had free access to all three machines until they reached 210 trials,
when they were asked to select the machine they liked best and play that one
exclusively. At the onset of the session, the participants were given 14 pennies to
use in play and were told that their earnings were exchangeable for prizes, the
more money they won, the better the prize they could buy at the end. The
results indicated a significant sex difference associated with low probability
payoff and intermediate probability payoff. Boys made the greatest number Of
responses on the intermediate (1/3) and low probability (1/8) pay-offs and the
least number of responses on the high probability pay-off machines (1/1). The
results for the girls were completely opposite, they demonstrated a higher
number of responses on the high probability pay-off machines (1/1) and the least
on the intermediate (1/3) and low probability machines (1/8). Again, the
differences between boys' choices and girls' choices here may be differences in
sensitivity to maximization. Females may be more disciplined in their risktaking as a consequence of perceived risk-reward values.
Logue and Chavarro (1992) performed a choice experiment in which two
options were offered to children of preschool age. The impulsive option was one
sticker with no delay to reinforcement. Selection of the self-controlled option
yielded three stickers with a 30 second wait. Although neither preschool boys
nor the preschool girls behaved significantly more self-controlled than
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impulsive, the boys did choose the impulsive option significantly more than the
preschool girls.
Although experimental investigations into self-control and impulsivity are
preferred, there are other means with which to examine the behavioral and
personality trait of impulsivity. Impulsivity or the need for immediate
gratification can also be addressed through personality inventories. The lower
thresholds of self-control may also be associated with sensation-seeking, such
that risk-taking behavior may be a quality expressed by those with a high need
for stimulation or sensation.
Zuckerman's Sensation Seeking Scales

Marvin Zuckerman posited through the publication of a series of
sensation-seeking scales (forms I-VI) that individuals exhibit differing sensationseeking dimensions. Such that individuals may have a temperament that
corresponds to a profile of risk-taking or sensation-seeking. Individual
stimulation preferences have been shown to predict gambling and risk-taking
behavior. Those who score high on Zuckerman's sensation-seeking subscale of
disinhibition typically place larger bets at dice (Zenker and Wolfgang, 1982), and
blackjack (Kuhlman, 1975) than participants with lower disinhibition scores.
Sensation-seeking behavior may be attributed to one's optimal level of
stimulation. The idea of an optimal arousal level originated with Donald Hebb
through his research concerning pain thresholds. Hebb also applied the optimal-
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t

level theory as a behavioral construct of motivation; too little stimulation leads to
sensation-seeking and too much stimulation leads to stimulation-avoidance
behavior (Zuckerman, 1994).

The SSS has been used to predict a broad range of

risky behaviors, including pathological gambling (e.g., Blanco, Orensanz-Munoz,
Blanco-Jerez, & Saiz-Ruiz, 1996; Blaszcznski, McConaghy, & Frankova, 1990),
alcohol abuse (e.g. Baker, Beer, & Beer, 1991; Darkes, Greenbaum, & Goldman,
1998), drug use (Galizio & Stein, 1983), involvement in high risk sports (Bouter,
Knipschild, Feij, & Volovics, 1988; Breivik, Roth, & Jorgensen, 1998; Freixanet,
1991), and engaging in risky sexual behaviors (e.g., Apt & Hurlbert, 1992;
Donohew, Zimmerman, Cupp, Novak, Colon, & Abell, 2000; Kalichman,
Johnson, Adair, Rompa, Multhauf, & Kelly, 1994, Kalichman & Rompa, 1995).
There are at least fourteen different variations of Zuckerman's scales, including
Forms I through VI, translations into Arabic (Torki, 1993), Hebrew (Birenbaum,
1986), Oriyan (Mahanta, 1983), Finnish (Eysenck & Haapasalo, 1989) and Spanish
(Perez, Qrtet, Pla, & Simo, 1986), and adaptations for children (e.g., Russo,
Lakely, Christ, Frick, McBurnett, Walker, Loeber, Stouthamer-Louber, & Green,
1991).
The scales employed for this study were forms V and VI. Form V, is an
interest and preference questionnaire, it measures an individual's disinhibition,
boredom susceptibility, thrill and adventure-seeking, and excitement-seeking
through factor analysis of each trait in a 40-item/trait scale, with 10-items
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devoted to each trait. A total score can also be calculated for an overall
sensation-seeking score within one's interests arid recreational preferences. Form
VI, is an activities schedule with two parts. The first part of this scale consists of
64 items designed to measure one's experience. A scenario is provided and the
participant must indicate whether they have never engaged in that kind of
experience, experienced it once, or experienced the scenario multiple times. The
second part of the scale has another 64-items with which the individual must rate
their intent in the future concerning disinhibition and thrill and adventureseeking again on a 3-choice scale. Zuckerman's sensation-seeking scales may
provide a valid and reliable means for testing individual differences in
stimulation-seeking behavior and how that pursuit of stimulation may influence
risk preferences in a foraging task.
Support for the daily energy budget model would reveal further insight
into human risk-taking behavior under ordinary, everyday circumstances like
gambling and a willingness to engage in monetary debt-earning behavior. The
support of sex differences in the choice tasks would further support to the
adaptionist model that males and females may be biologically prepared to
choose different options based on the risk potential of those choices. The
purpose of this research was to investigate the patterns of human foraging
behavior in a binary choice option using an indirectly manipulated energy
budget. The only other study of risk-sensitive foraging theory using a daily
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energy budget model and human subjects was that of Pietras and Hackenberg
(2001). Using a small-n design (n = 3), Pietras and Hackenberg were able to find
risk-averse behavior under positive budget conditions and risk-prone behavior
under negative conditions for two of the three subjects. The third did not
demonstrate strong risk-sensitive biases. Although small-n designs are
creditable and typical in comparative research, one of the goals of this study was
to apply a group design to in a computerized choice task. In addition, one of the
benefits of utilizing a human subject pool, is the ability of adults to describe their
choice behavior and to provide further insight into the conditions with which
they may select one risky option over an alternate. Given the verbal language
abilities of our sample, we also sought to find a measure that may predict risksensitive behavior under a choice task. It was anticipated that Marvin
Zuckerman's sensation seeking scales form V and VI would provide this
predictive measure of risky choice selection.
Prior to executing the current choice preference study, a pilot was
conducted to determine what methodological problems might arise as a
consequence of developing a computerized risk task in a group design with
human subjects. The first challenge was to find a reward that was salient and
reinforcing for participant behavior and would also facilitated discrimination of
the choice options. Points were provided as reinforcement for the two choice
options, with either a fixed number of points for the risk-averse option or
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variable for the risk-prone options. These points were then exchangeable at the
end of the experimental session for a previously undisclosed sum of money.
However, the money did not appear to be a significant motivator of behavior,
primarily because participants did not believe they would actually receive
monetary earnings for their points. A competitive component was added to
enhance subject motivation and the money award was retained in order to
maintain consistency between the two studies. In most natural foraging
situations, there are competitors for desirable resources, therefore it is anticipated
that the inclusion of a competitor would increase the saliency of the task and the
meaningfulness of the win. In addition, the provision of the illusion of
competition should lend creditability to the task as an analogue to foraging in a
more naturalistic environment. For humans, the natural environment does not
have to be outside, in the woods, or among the wildlife. Casinos, malls, and
parking lots qualify as natural settings with which foraging for resource may
take place, in this case the environment is within an academic setting.
There are two hypotheses for this study: The first asserts that males will
demonstrate risk-averse behavior under the positive budget (winning) and riskprone behavior under the negative-budget (losing), while the females will
demonstrate risk-averse responding for both the positive (winning) and the
negative budget (losing) conditions, with the most risk-aversion evidenced under
the positive budget condition. The second hypothesis posits that the sensation-
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seeking dimensions from form V or form VI will be predictive of choice behavior
and risk strategy in the experimental task.
Method
Participants

Male (n = 100) and female (n = 150) psychology students were solicited
from the Introductory Psychology Course subject pool consisting of 8 different
class sections ranging in age from 18 to 59 years.
Apparatus

Two PC computers were used for the choice task. The computer task was
programmed using a Visual Basic 6.0 program and operated under the Windows
95 operating system.

Procedure

Participants were welcomed into the experimental room (measuring 2.55 x
3.57 m) where two computers were situated side-by-side and separated by a
partition 1.8 m in height. The experimental room could accommodate two
participants per one-hour experimental session. Participant numbers, age and
sex of the participant were entered into a subject record form presented on the
computer screen just prior to the start of the computer task. Once this
information was entered into the computer, participants were asked to read and
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sign an informed consent sheet. When the participants read the instructions to
the forced choice trials (see figure 1 in the appendix) and felt comfortable starting
the experiment, they clicked on an icon at the bottom of their participant record
form labeled "start," following this action the forced-choice trials were
presented.
The task was divided into two phases, the forced-choice phase and the
free choice phase. Forced choice trials were used to ensure that participants
received exposure to both choice options. The participants were presented with
one of the two choice boxes during each trial and "forced" to choose the
presented item and consequently learn the point value associated with that color,
but no data was recorded concerning choices. The side (left or right)
presentation of the choice box was randomized within the computer task and the
point value attributed to each choice box was counterbalanced in an effort to
minimize color or side bias rather than point discrimination. Participant
selection of the variable option yielded 1 or 5 points, with p(l) = .5 and p (5) = .5
whereas selection of the fixed option yielded 3 points exclusively. The two
choice options provided an average reward amount of 3 points, regardless of the
strategy employed; the two options had equivalent expected utilities. The trials
were divided into 10 forced-choice trials and 80 free-choice trials. In both sets of
trials, a choice was recorded after the participant clicked on the stimulus box
three times. In both the forced ®*d free*:hoice trials, the participant had to
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mouse-click three times on the stimulus box in order for their choice to be
recognized as a decision and recorded in the data file. Three mouse clicks
represented a committed choice rather than a single click in an effort to minimize
impulsive choosing and to give participants an opportunity to change their
decision. Once a choice had been made, the unselected box disappeared and the
chosen box remained visible while the point value for that choice was displayed
for 3-seconds (1 or 5 for the variable choice and 3 for the fixed choice). Following
the forced-choice trials, a second instruction screen was presented (see Figure 2)
and the free-choice trials commenced (see Figure 4). At the inception of the freechoice trials, a connecting screen was presented with a 10-second count down to
"log-on" with a linking designation. In addition, the participants were shown a
status screen with a bar indicating "even" along a status (winning vs. losing)
barometer (see Figure 5). The program randomly assigned equal subjects to
budget conditions by assigning a positive budget (winning) or negative budget
(losing) to subjects by participant number. Following the first 20 trials, the status
screen interrupted choice selection with the participant's status relative to the
Internet competitor (they were told they were competing against a student from
a university designated as "WSU"). Every 20 trials the status screen interrupted
choice selection with a change in the location of the status bar along a winning or
losing barometer; but the participant, regardless of their choice never fell ahead
or behind after their budget was established as "winning" or "losing." The
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change in placement of the status bar along the barometer was only to facilitate
the illusion of movement. During the free-choice trials the individual's
participant number was visible along with the University of Montana's
abbreviated letters, "UM" at the lower left hand comer of the screen. The
competing participant's number (same as the UM subject) and their University
designation "WSU" were also visible in the lower right hand corner of the screen.
This component of the task was included to provide some degree of realism to
the game and creditability to the Internet competitor; many of the games
available on the Internet provide these kinds of cues.
Following the free choice trials an appreciation screen (see Figure 3) was
visible and instructed the participants to self-address an envelope for their
winnings and the receipt of an announcement providing a presentation time and
location concerning the research and how their involvement contributed, this
acted as a formal debriefing. Participants were also asked to complete two of
Zuckerman's sensation-seeking scales (SSS), the Interest and Preference scale,
Form V and the Activities Scale, Form VI (1994). Subjects Were paid one dollar
as a participation endowment (regardless of whether they were provided
feedback of winning or losing) following the experimental session. A monetary
reward was promised to the winner in the free-choice instruction screen, this was
honored to maintain consistency with a pilot study conducted prior to this
investigation. However, participants were not awarded this winning, nor were
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they provided a debriefing until all participants data had been collected and
recorded in an effort to reduce participant outcome contamination by leakage
from other subjects. Participants were sent their dollar endowment along with
an announcement flier regarding the date, place, and time of the debriefing
presentation. A post-experimental interview was also immediately administered
following the experiment in order to determine how competitive the subjects felt
as a result of the competitor pairing in the task.
Results
All statistical analyses of choice data were conducted using the proportion
of risk-prone choices. The risk-prone proportion was calculated by dividing the
number of variable option choices by the total number of trials (n=60, this
excludes the first 20 trials). Table 1 shows one-sample t-test results for the riskprone proportion for each budget/sex combination. The male/positive budget
group demonstrated a risk-averse bias while all other groups demonstrated riskindifference.

Insert Table 1 About Here

A 2 (budget) x 2 (sex) ANOVA was conducted using the proportion of
risk-prone choices as the outcome variable. Results from the ANOVA revealed
no main effect for Budget (F(l, 247) = 1.10, p > .05), no main effect for Sex
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(F(l, 247) = 1.77, p > .05), but a statistically significant Budget x Sex interaction
(F(l, 247) =10.98, p < .05). A post-hoc analysis of the interaction, using Tukey's
HSD (NH=60.0194, a =.05), revealed that the male/positive budget group was
more risk-averse than the male/negative budget group and female/positive
budget group. All other pair-wise comparisons were not statistically significant.
Bivariate correlations were computed to determine if age (r = .004, p > .05)
counterbalance (r = -.042, p > .05), or time of day (r = .053, p > .05) correlated
with the proportion of risk-prone choices, there were no statistically significant
correlations among these variables and the dependent variable.

Insert Figure 6 About Here

The second hypothesis for this study predicted that one or more of the
dimensions on the sensation-seeking scales from form V or form VI would
correlate with risk-preference. There were two significant correlations with the
overall proportion of risk-prone choices from two dimensions within form V.
The first dimension was that of boredom susceptibility among male subjects
only, this was a weak, negative correlation with overall risk prone choices (r = .199, p > .05) The second dimension was that of disinhibition for females only,
this was a weak, positive correlation with overall risk-prone choices (r = .174, p >
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.05). There were no significant correlations for any of the dimensions on form VI
for males or females. Thus, little to no support was found for hypothesis 2.

Insert Table 2 About Here

Score reliability can be eliminated as a potential cause for the poor
predictive ability of the sensation-seeking scales for choice behavior. The score
reliabilities are acceptable for all the dimensions in form V with the exception of
boredom susceptibility and disinhibition. The score reliabilities are fair to good
for form VI among both males and females, with 0.8 indicating good score
reliability.

Insert Table 3 About Here

Insert Table 4 About Here

The post-experimental interview questions were also examined to assess
the levels of motivation expressed by participants due to the monetary reward,
the competitive component, their level of interest in the task, and if they believed
they chose one choice option consistently more than the other during the task
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(self-reported risk-sensitivity). There were no statistically significant differences
between male and female responses to these questions and therefore this cannot
account for differences in male and female choice preferences in the experimental
task.

Insert Table 5 About Here

Discussion
Hypothesis One. The results provide partial support for the first

hypothesis. There were statistically significant differences between males and
females in their choice preference, but the females did not demonstrate a
statistically significant choice preference toward the fixed or variable option for
this experimental task. The males demonstrated risk-averse behavior under a
positive budget and less risk-averse behavior under a negative budget. The daily
energy budget model, as a second order model is rigid in the assumptions it
applies to fitness. Second order models typically assume that the foraging
organism recognizes that they should optimize their net intake in relation to their
energetic requirements and has insight into where along the continuum of
energy they are currently operating; this is unlikely to be the case. Birds and
small mammals have a faster metabolism and therefore their energetic
discrepancies should be more divergent than for a large mammal, like a human
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being. Humans are capable of going for long periods of time without eating due
to relatively stable lipid reserves. These reserves provide an unparalleled
advantage for large mammals that are not necessarily available to most birds,
fish or smaller mammals. The application of second order models to large
mammals using a risk-sensitive theoretical framework may be too inflexible, as it
does not consider the possibility of other fitness functions underlying the
behavior (Smallwood, P.D., 1996). This may explain why the females did not
demonstrate risk-sensitive behavior under either the positive or negative budget
condition. In addition, most of the participants in this study were between 18
and 25 years of age and in their first year of college, for most college females, this
means they were of pre-bred age. Their behavior may have been different had
they conceived one or more children. The cost to energetic reserves and the way
in which females change their perceptions of valued resources once they have to
care for another could also influence the way in which they respond to variation
in resource rewards. Questions of parenting status were not asked in the
demographics screen and therefore not recorded for this study. Parenting status
may be a factor to investigate in further studies of risk-sensitive behavior among
human, female subjects.
In spite of those studies that successfully demonstrated risk-sensitive
behavior of mammalian subjects under manipulated budgets (Barnard & Brown,
1985; Battalio, Kagel, & McDonald, 1985; Zabludoff, 1988), a number of studies
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using an energy budget manipulation with mammals have had greater difficulty
in teasing out significant sensitivity under both conditions. Kagel, and
McDonald (1986) reported risk-averse behavior by rats under a positive budget
in a discrete trials manipulation with variability in water as the variable reward
and risk indifference under a negative budget. Lawes and Perrin (1995) used
ambient temperature as a means of manipulating the energy budget for round
eared elephant shrews. The shrews demonstrated some risk-averse responding
under a positive budget and no preference under a negative budget condition.
Given there are so many variables that can affect one's energy budget under
experimental conditions it is further complicated by using humans as a subject
source. Human behavior is not static, nor is it consistent. Behavior can be
influenced by context, previous experience, whether individuals have recently
eaten, been paid, and the way individuals perceive the risk option can also be
influenced by these same factors. Human subjects bring their previous
experience from the day, the week, the month and potentially their reproductive
history (likely more meaningful biologically to females) into the laboratory. We
further confuse the task by simulating a true negative budget condition. The
losing condition within the competitive treatment does not necessarily take
anything away from the participant when they lose. Unlike true negative budget
conditions, energy is removed from a current bank of reserves. The money
promised to the winner under the experimental condition is a surplus of
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"energy" since they did not have any money to start. A potential solution to this
problem would be to provide the participants with a monetary award prior to
engaging in the task and to ask participants to make choice selections that would
preserve their awarded sum. The goal in this context would change from trying
to accumulate points to avoiding point accrual. This method could change the
trajectory of responding by increasing the believability of the money reward and
also better represent a negative energy budget.
In spite of the budget difficulties, the following question is still relevant to
humans: Are we risk-sensitive foragers? To a modest degree, the answer appears
to be yes for adult males, but the results are still inconclusive regarding females.
It could be that this study did not target the most sensitive age group or the
manipulation may not have provided relevant feedback for female participants
in comparison to males. Pietras and Hackenberg (2001) successfully
demonstrated risk-sensitivity in humans in their choice task. One of their two
female subjects and the only male subjects demonstrated risk-sensitive choice
preferences. As a group design, the current study did not address choice
preferences among individuals. It may be worthwhile to further investigate
individual responses to determine how many individual females were risksensitive as opposed to the averaged response of the group. This is clearly one
benefit of a small-n design, as averaging behavior across the group may not
necessarily reflect any one participant's behavior.
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Hypothesis Two. The second hypothesis of this study was not supported,

given that only two dimensions from form V were correlated with proportion of
risk-prone choice preference. Clearly the sensation seeking scales were not a
good indicator for predicting risk-sensitive behavior under this experimental
methodology. Further investigation into other personality scales that include a
sensation-seeking or risk-taking dimension should be sought in place of
Zuckerman's form V and form V scales.
Further investigations into risk-sensitive behavior with human subjects
within a group design could aim to better manipulate the energy budget. This
may be addressed by provisioning money to the participant at the inception of
the experimental task and requiring that they conserve that resource by selecting
choice options that reduce notable point accrual or by including an effort
component within the choice procedure. Both of these changes may better reflect
a true energy state, rather than just telling the participant that they are winning
or that they need to click on the choice boxes. If a joystick with varying force
settings were utilized as the vehicle for making a choice selection, then perhaps
subjects could be divided into low response effort and high response effort
groups. The low-effort group would represent the positive budget and the higheffort group would act as an analogue to the negative budget. Again the
participant would have to select from two choice options, but instead of clicking
on the stimuli, they would have to move a cursor via a joystick that has
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adjustable force settings, thereby making the cursor movement difficult or easy.
It is difficult to simulate or actually induce a caloric loss using human subjects in
an experimental task, but a response effort component may be one way to better
manipulate a biological energy budget and still use a human sample. Increases
in response effort may precipitate changes in foraging strategy. The organism
would have to adjust their behavior and choice selection to accommodate the
environmental demands made to the forager's energy reserve. Increased effort
may then facilitate risk-prone choices and lower effort is predicted to foster riskaverse selections, such that higher energy demands are predicted to encourage
riskier choice selection and lower energy demands more conservative choice
selections.
It is relevant to investigate risk-sensitivity in humans because so much of
our behavior is dictated by the estimation of the cost-benefits of a given choice.
Insight into the mechanism and proclivity males and females may have for
differing risk situations could facilitate greater understanding and additional
research within the context of gambling, economics, and cognition. Further
examination of this area of behavior must be addressed before conclusive
statements can be made concerning risk-sensitivity among humans.
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Table 1

Risk Prone Choice Proportions for Males and Females

Males

Females

SEM
.029

One-sample
t-value
-3.20**

Positive Budget

53

Proportion of RiskProne Choices
.41

Negative Budget

47

.51

.023

0.381

Positive Budget

73

.52

.018

0.832

Negative Budget

77

.46

.021

-1.75

n

* p< .05 (2-tailed).
** p< .01 (2-tailed).
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Table 2

Correlations Between T-Scores of Form V , Form VI and Proportion of Risk-Prone
(RP) Choices for Males and Females

Dimension
DIS

BS

TAS

ES

Total

E-DIS

I-DIS

E-TAS

I-TAS

Males (n = 100)

Correlation (r)
w ith Proportion
RP Choices
.012

Females (n = 150)

.174*

Males (n = 100)

-.199*

Females (n = 150)

.059

Males (n

.041

Sex

100)

Females (n »150)

.086

Males (n = 100)

.120

Females (n = 150)

-.090

Males (n = 100)

-.010

Females (n = 150)

.100

Males (n = 100)

.013

Females (n = 150)

.031

Males (n = 100)

.136

Females (n ~ 150)

.057

Males (n = 100)

-.019

Females (n = 150)

-.062

Males (n = 100)

.120

Females (n = 150)

-.013

C orrelation is statistically significant at the .05 a level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is statistically significant at the .01 a level (2-tailed).
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Table 3

Cronbach Alpha Reliabilities for Form V and Form VI Subscale Scores

Cronbach's a

Mean

Std. Dev.

Males (n = 100)

.72

8.30

1.97

Females (n = 150)

.75 .

7.46

2.41

Males (n = 100)

.55

6.34

1.95

Females (n = 150)

.68

6.11

2.27

Males (n ^ 100)

.75

5.67

2.60

Females (n = 150)

.74

4.54

2.62

Males (n = 100)

.41

3.41

1.79

Females (n = 150)

.28

2.85

1.53

Males (n = 100)

.77

29.72

5.45

Females (n = 150)

.78

20.97

5.74

Cronbach's a

Mean

Std. Dev.

Males (n -100)

.70

27.10

4.68

Females (n = 150)

.66

25.25

4.44

Males (n = 100)

.89

91.57

13.79

Females (n = 150)

.90

83,29

14.67

Males (n = 100)

.89

51.51

8.95

Females (n = 150)

.88

47.60

8.71

Males (n = 100)

.90

96.45

16.82

Females (n = 150)

.91

83.88

17.37

Subscale Form V.
TAS

ES

DIS

BS

Total

Subscale Form VI.
E-TAS

E-DIS

I-TAS

I-DIS
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Table 4

T-Scores, Standard Deviations, Standard Errors of the Mean, and t-values
for Form V & VI
Means

Std,

SEM

Males (n =100)

47.71

10.72

1.077

Females (n =150)

47.24

11.94

.972

Males (n =100)

48.14

8.93

.897

Females (n =150)

48.56

7.18

.585

TAS

Males (n =100)
Females (n =150)

52.47
53.16

9,10
9.07

.914
.738

ES

Males (n =100)

55.43

8.92

.897

Females (n =150)

54.48

9.98

.813

Males (n =100)

51.68

10.34

1.04

Females (n =150)

50.97

8,46

.689

Subscale; Form VI

Means

Std, Dev, SEM

E-TAS Males (n =100)

60.06

9.99

1.00

Females (n =150) 62.94

11.49

.935

Males (n =100)

8.10

.821

10.03

,816

53,86

9.44

,949

Females (n =150) 54.81

9.35

.761

Males (n =100)

8.54

.859

16.98

.855

Subscale; Form V,
DIS

BS

Total

E-DIS

49.50

Females (n =150) 50.54
I-TAS

I-DIS

Males (n =100)

49.21

Females (n =150) 82.34
* p< .05 (2-tailed).
** p< .01 (2-tailed).

One-sample
t-value
0.316

=0.405

-0.583
0.773

0-593
One-sample
t-value
-2.039*

-0.869

-0.782

1.671
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Table 5

Post-Experimental Interview Questions
Means, Standard Deviations, One-sample t-test, standard errors of the mean.

Mean

Std. Dev. SEM

One-Sample
t-value

Males (n = 100)

2.2

.83

.083

-0.593

Females ( n = 150)

2.2

.76

.062

Males (n = 100)

1.6

.79

.079

Females ( n =; 150)

1.8

.82

.067

Males (n -100)

1.9

.75

.075

Females ( n = 150)

2.0

.67

.055

Males (n = 100)

.75

.44

.044

.70

.46

.037
** p< .01 (2-tailed)

Post-Experimental Interview

M otivator ($):

M otivator
(Competitor):

-1.775

-0.701

Interest:

Risk
Sensitivity:

Females ( n = 150)
* p< .05 (2-tailed)

0.781

SCALE
M otivator ($ Reward):
Scale: 1- H ad considerable influence on how I chose.
2- H ad some influence on how I chose.
3- H ad no influence on how I chose.
Motivator (Competitor):
Scale: 1- H ad considerable influence on how I chose.
2- H ad some influence on how I chose.
3- H ad no influence on how I chose.
Interest (Bored vs. Engaged):
Scale: 1 -1 was bored w ith the task
2 -1 was engaged in the task
3 -1 was interested in the task
Risk Sensitive:
Scale: 0 -Chose the two options evenly
1- Chose one option consistently more than the other
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Figure 1

Instructions for the Forced-Choice Trials

INSTRUCTIONS
Once you start the program, you will be presented w ith set of practice
trials. During these trials, a yellow OR a blue choice box will be visible. These
two choice options yield differing point values, all you have to do is CLICK 3
consecutive times on the visible choice box until a point value is shown. The
practice trials will only present you w ith one choice box (yellow or blue) at a
time and none of the points will be incrementing. These trials are in place in an
effort to familiarize you w ith the different point values of each choice selection.
After 10 trials, you will be presented w ith another instruction screen.
The second instruction screen will signal the start of the free-choice trials,
your points be incrementing for that task and you will be competing with
another student for points. If you have questions, please ask the researcher now
to clarify, if you do not, please click "start program" to begin.
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Figure 2

Instructions for the Free-Choice Trials

INSTRUCTIONS
Now that you have been exposed to the two choice options, you will be
asked to connect to the Internet to compete w ith a student from a participating
college. In this part of the study, you will again select one of the two choice
boxes in each trial. Again the two boxes will represent either a variable point
am ount of 1 or 5, or a constant amount of 3, just like in the forced choice trials.
However, now your points will accumulate in a point box at the bottom of the
screen. In addition, you will be able to determine where you are (winning,
losing, or even) relative to your competitor via a status barometer along the right
side of the experimental screen. Remember you are competing for points, but
whoever wins the game will receive a MONETARY PRIZE provided by a grant
funded by the National Psychological Community (NPC).
All of the sign-up times, including yours, were paired w ith sign-up times
from the participating University. Given the variability w ith which students
arrive to their appointment, there may be a brief delay while your competitor
completes the forced choice trials, reads the instructions, and logs on the Internet.
Please be patient. Your game id number will be your participant number and the
abbreviation "UM" for the University of Montana. Your competitor will have the
same participant number, but w ith a different college abbreviation. When you
have read and understand these instructions, log on by clicking on the "connect"
button at the bottom of the screen.
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Figure 3

Appreciation Screen

Thank you for your participation!
You will receive two experimental credits for your involvement in this
study. Before you leave, please address the envelope, complete our
questionnaires, and w ait for the post-experimental interview. YOU ARE
EXPECTED TO MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THIS TASK! Please
do not discuss any aspect of this experiment with your peers. Thank you &
enjoy your day!
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Figure 4

Free-Choice Screen

+3
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Figure 5

Status Screen

W IN N IN G -

The bar to your right
indicates how far ahead, "winning"
or behind, "losing" you are
EVEN
with your competitor.

I

LOSING -

|

n

Status Bar

Status Barometer
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Figure 6

Proportion of Risk-Prone (RP) Choices by Males and Females
Under a Positive and Negative Energy Budget

0.7 -

Proportion of RP Choices

0.6

-

0.4 -

0.2

2

1

1=Positive Budget, 2 = Negative Budget

Males - *

Females
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SENSATION-SEEKING SCALE, FORM V
INTEREST & PREFERENCE QUESTIONNAIRE
Participant Number:
Date & T im e:. ____,
Sex:
MALE
FEMALE
Researcher___________________
Directions: Each of the items below contains two choices A and B. Please circle which of the
choices most describes your likes or the way you feel. In some cases you may find items in which
both choices describe your likes or feelings. Please choose the one which better describes your
likes or feelings. In some cases you may find items in which you do not like either choice. In
these cases, mark the choices you dislike least. Do not leave any item s blank. It is important
you respond to all items with only one choice, A or B. We are interested only in your likes or
feelings, not in how others feel about these things or how one is supposed to feel. There are no
right or wrong answers, as in other kinds of tests. Be candid and give your honest appraisal of
yourself.
1.
A.
I like wild uninhibited parties.
B.
I prefer quiet parties with good conversation.
2.

A.
B.

There are some movies I enjoy seeing a second or even a third time.
I can't stand watching a movie that I have seen before.

3.

A.
B.

I often w ish I could be a mountain climber.
I can't understand people who risk their necks climbing mountains.

4.

A.
B.

I dislike all body odors.
I like some of the earthy body smells.

5.

A.
B.

I get bored seeing the same old faces.
I like the comfortable familiarity of everyday friends.

6.

A.

I like to explore a strange city or section of town by m yself, even if it
means getting lost.
I prefer a guide when I am in a place I don't know well.

B.
7.

A.
B.

I dislike people who do or say things just to shock or upset others.
When you can predict almost everything a person w ill do and say he or she must be a
bore.

8.

A.

I usually don't enjoy a m ovie or a play where I can predict what w ill
happen in advance.
I don't mind watching a movie or a play where I can predict what w ill
happen in advance.

B.

9.

A.
B.

I have tried marijuana or would like to.
I would never smoke marijuana.
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10.

A.
B.

I would not like to try any drug which might produce strange and
dangerous side effects.
I would like to try some of the drugs that produce hallucinations.

11.

A.
B.

A sensible person avoids activities that are dangerous.
I sometimes like to do things that are a little frightening.

12.

A.
B.

I dislike "swingers" (People who are uninhibited and free about sex).
I enjoy the company of real "swingers."

13.

A.
B.

I find that stimulants make me uncomfortable.
I often like to get high (drinking liquor or smoking marijuana).

14.

A.
B.

I like to try new foods that I have never tasted before.
I order the dishes with which I am familiar so as to avoid disappointment
and unpleasantness.

15.

A.
B.

I enjoy looking at home movies, videos, or travel slides.
Looking at someone's home movies, videos, or travel slides bores me
tremendously.
1

16.

A.
B.

I would like to take up the sport of water skiing.
I would not like to take up water skiing.

17.

A.
B.

I would like to try surfboard riding.
I would not like to try surfboard riding.

18.

A.

I would like to take off on a trip with no preplanned or definite routes or
timetables.
When I go on a trip, I like to plan my route and timetable fairly carefully.

B.
19.

A.
B.

I prefer the "down to earth" kind of people as friends.
I would like to make friends in some of the "far out" groups like artists or
"punks."

20.

A.
B.

I would not like to learn to fly an airplane.
I would like to learn to fly an airplane.

21.

A.
B.

I prefer the surface of the water to the depths.
I would like to go scuba diving.

22.

A.
B.

I would like to meet some persons who are homosexual (men or women).
I stay away from any I suspect of being "gay" or "lesbian."

23.

A.
B.

I would like to try parachute jumping.
I would never want to try jumping out of a plane with or without a parachute.

24.

A.
B.

I prefer friends who are excitingly unpredictable.
I prefer friends who are reliable and predictable.
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I am not interested in experience for its own sake.
I like to have new and exciting experiences and sensations, even if they are a little
frightening, unconventional, or illegal.
The essence of good art is in its clarity, symmetry of form, and harmony of colors.
I often find beauty in the "clashing" of colors and irregular forms of modern
paintings.
I enjoy spending time in the familiar surroundings of home.
I get very restless if I have to stay around home for any length of time.
I like to dive off the high board.
I don't like the feeling I get standing on the high board (or I don't go near it).
I like to date persons who are physically exciting.
I like to date persons who share my values.
Heavy drinking usually ruins a party because some people get loud and
boisterous.
Keeping the drinks full is the key to a good party.
The worst social sin is to be rude.
The worst social sin is to be a bore.
A person should have considerable sexual experience before marriage.
It's better if two married persons begin their sexual experience before
marriage.
Even if I have the money, I would not care to associate with flighty rich
persons in the "jet set."
I could conceive of m yself seeking pleasures around the world with the
"jet set."
I like people who are sharp and witty even if they do sometimes insult others.
I dislike people who have their fun at the expense of hurting the feelings of others.
There is altogether too much portrayal of sex in the movies.
I enjoy watching many of the "sexy" scenes in movies.
I feel best after taking a couple of drinks.
Something is wrong with people who need liquor to feel good.
People should dress according to some standard of taste, neatness, and
style.
People should dress in individual ways even if the effects are sometimes
strange.
Sailing long distances in small sailing crafts is foolhardy.
I would like to sail a long distance in a small, but seaworthy sailing craft.
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I have no patience with dull or boring people.
I find something interesting in almost every person I talk to.
Skiing down a high mountain slope is a good way to end up on crutches.
I think I would enjoy the sensations of skiing very fast down a high mountain
slope.
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SENSATION-SEEKING SCALE, FORM VI
Part I - Experience Questionnaire
Participant Number:
Date & Tim e:______
Sex:
MALE
FEMALE
Researcher:______________________
Directions: Below you w ill find a list of many different kinds of activities.
Please indicate whether you have actually engaged in this activity or not.
Answer all items using one of the following options:
A.
B.
C

I have never done this.
I have done this once.
I have done this more than once.

Please mark only one response for each of the items: A, B, or C. Please answer all of the items.
Please be candid and honest in answering these items. There are no right or wrong answers. We
are only interested in your experiences, not in how others might regard these activities. Your
responses are entirely confidential.
1.

Climbing a steep mountain.

2.

Reading books about explicit sex.

3.

Running in a marathon.

4.

Traveling around with a spontenous, uninhibited, fun-loving group.

5.

Going to a "wild," uninhibited party.

6.

Walking on a tightrope.

7.

Being in the company of people who are very casual about sex, and who sometimes
switch partners.

8.
_9.
_______10.
_11.

Being "disrespectful" to a teacher or employer.
Taking an unknown drug.
Shocking older persons just for the fun of it.
Swimming in the English Channel.

_______12.

Having sex in public (where others were doing the same thing).

_______13.

Parachute jumping.

______ 14.

Having premarital sexual relations.

_______15.

Flying an airplane.

______ 16.

Getting "high" in the company of other people.

_______17.

Doing something illegal, but enjoyable.

_______18.

Scuba diving.

____ 19.

Horseback riding at a gallop.
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_20.

Sailing long distance.

_21.

Swimming alone far out from shore.

22.

Having a sexual relationship with someone you just met and may not see again.

_23.

Climbing Mount Everest

_24.

Skiing down high mountain slopes.

_25.

Sacrificing safety to speed when driving a car.

_26.

Doing something very unconventional.

_27.

Trying cocaine.

_28.

Exploring caves.

_29.

Discussing your sex life with friends.

_30.

Hunting lions and tigers.

_31.

Going to an "X-rated" movie that shows open sexual activity.

_32.

Getting drunk deliberately.

_33.

Living with someone of the opposite sex in a temporary arrangement

_34.

Trying the drug LSD.

_35.

"Doing what feels good/' regardless of the consequences.

_36.

Racing cars.

_37.

Riding a motorcycle.

_38.

Enjoying "wild" or unusual sexual fantasies.

_39.

Backpacking in Europe.

_40.

Hitchhiking.

.41.

Traveling in Antarctica.

_42.

Going to a party where there is heavy drinking.

_43.

Associating with friends who are excitingly unpredictable.

.44.

Going to a large rock concert.

.45.

Taking a trip to the moon.

.46.

Going out with someone just because you find them physically exciting.

47.

Doing something dangerous because someone dared you to.

.48.

Doing unconventional things even if they are a little frightening.

49.

Refusing to follow an order from a parent or an employer.

50.

Snorkeling over a reef.

51.

Backpacking in the wilderness (in the U.S.A).

.52.

Having sex with more than one person on the same day.
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_53.

Traveling up the Amazon.

_54.

Stealing something when you knew you wouldn't be caught

_55.

Doing "crazy" things just to see the effects on others.

_56.

Using illegal drugs (other than marijuana).

_57.

Surviving alone on an island for a week.

_58.

Nude swimming in the company of persons of both sexes.

_59.

Seducing someone you wanted to sleep with.

_60.

Taking a long-odds bet rather than a sure bet if you had the chance to make a lot
of money.

_61.

Using marijuana.

_62.

"Picking up" someone of the opposite sex.

63.
_64.

Gambling for high stakes.
Going alone to a "singles bar."

Part II - Intentions for the Future
Directions: Below you w ill find a list of many different kinds of activities. Please indicate whether
you would like to engage in this activity in the future regardless of whether or not you haue engaged in
the activity in the past. Answer all items using one of the following options: IN THE FUTURE:

A.
B.
C.

I have no desire to do this.
I have thought of doing this, but probably will not do it
I have thought of doing this and will do it if I have the chance.

Please mark only one response for each of the items: A, B, or C. Answer all of the items.
Be candid and honest
_______65.

Climbing a steep mountain.

______ 66.

Reading books about explicit sex.

______ 67.

Running in a marathon.

_______68.

Traveling around with a spontaneous, uninhibited, fun-loving group.

_______69.

Going to a "wild," uninhibited party.

_______70.

Walking on a tightrope.

_______71.

Being in the company of people who are very casual about sex, and who
sometimes switch partners.

_______72.

Being "disrespectful" to a teacher or employer.

73.

Taking an unknown drug.

74.

Shocking older persons just for the fun of it

75.

Swimming in the English Channel.

_76.

Having sex in public (where others were doing the same thing).
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_77.

Parachute jumping.

_78.

Having premarital sexual relations.

_79.

Flying an airplane.

_80.

Getting "high" in the company of other people.

_81.

Doing something illegal, but enjoyable.

_82.

Scuba diving.

_83.

Horseback riding at a gallop.

_84,

Sailing long distance.

_85.

Swimming alone far out from shore.

_86.

Having a sexual relationship with someone you just met and may not see
again.

_87.

Climbing Mount Everest

_88.

Skiing down high mountain slopes.

_89.

Sacrificing safety to speed when driving a car.

_90.

Doing something very unconventional.

_91.

Trying cocaine.

_92.

Exploring caves.

_93,

Discussing your sex life with friends.

_94.

Hunting lions and tigers.

_95.

Going to an "X-rated" movie that shows open sexual activity.

_96.

Getting drunk deliberately.

_97.

Living with someone of the opposite sex in a temporary arrangement.

_98.

Trying the drug LSD.

_99.

"Doing what feels good," regardless of the consequences.

_100.

Racing cars.

_101.

Riding a motorcycle.

_102.

Enjoying "wild" or unusual sexual fantasies.

_103.

Backpacking in Europe.

_104.

Hitchhiking.

JOS.

Traveling in Antarctica.

_106.

Going to a party where there is heavy drinking.

_107.

Associating with friends who are excitingly unpredictable.

_108.

Going to a large rock concert
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_109.

Taking a trip to the moon.

_110.

Going out with someone just because you find them physically exciting.

_111.

Doing something dangerous because someone dared you to.

_112.

Doing unconventional things even if they are a little frightening.

_113.

Refusing to follow an order from a parent or an employer.

_114.

Snorkeling over a reef.

_115.

Backpacking in the wilderness (in the U.S.A).

_116.

Having sex with more than one person on the same day.

_117.

Traveling up the Amazon.

_118.

Stealing something when you knew you wouldn't be caught

_119.

Doing "crazy" things just to see the effects on others.

JL20.

Using illegal drugs (other than marijuana).

.121.

Surviving alone on an island for a week.

.122.

Nude swimming in the company of persons of both sexes.

.123.

Seducing someone you wanted to sleep with.

.124.

Taking a long-odds bet rather than a sure bet if you had the chance to make a
lot of money.

.125.

Using marijuana.

.126.

"Picking up" someone of the opposite sex.

.127.

Gambling for high stakes.

.128.

Going alone to a "singles bar."
End of Questionnaire.
Thank You.

